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ABSTRACT 
Securing the network communication for the smart grid requires a secure key distribution and management scheme. 
Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) is considered as an integral part of the smart grid that collects and analyzes the 
information of energy consumption using the communication network. In order to achieve data confidentiality, privacy, and 
authentication in AMI, various crypto algorithms are used, such as demand key distribution and management schemes. 
Investigation on properly designed key distribution and management scheme for securely gathering both individual and 
aggregated meter’s readings is one of the critical requirements. In this paper, we propose a secure key distribution for 
Home Area Network (HAN) in smart grid as well as a new key distribution and management scheme, which uses 
identification scheme of Wu – Hsu and tailored to smart grid. We also give the scheme for key update/freshness and key 
revocation. Specifically, a group ID based mechanism is proposed to establish the keys for a large amount of users with 
small overload.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The current power grid is ageing and cannot respond to the electricity quality requirements for the next century. 
Computation and communication capabilities are being incorporated in the power grid to promote it to smart grid. 
The smart grid, designed to replace traditional electric power infrastructure, is able to provide efficiency, security and 
reliability through a two-way flow of electricity and communication.  
Smart grid is the key technology that includes the current power grid with the necessary tools using advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies [1]. It includes a two-way digital communication infrastructure for real 
time information exchange [2] within the grid.  
In order to deploy the two-way communication, one possible solution is to use advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). 
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is one of the major advancements for collecting and analyzing the measurements 
of energy consumption using the communication network. An AMI includes software, hardware, communication networks, 
smart meters and customer-associated systems. As part of the AMI, the smart meters (SMs) have a processing chip and a 
nonvolatile storage so they can perform smart functions like periodic reporting of energy usage updates to end users as 
well as the generation facilities at power companies and communicate with smart appliances at home to control them. 
With the recent development of AMI, the cyber security issues in AMI are becoming very important, as AMI is part of the 
critical infrastructure of the smart grid. In order to achieve data confidentiality, privacy and authentication in AMI, new key 
distribution and management scheme is needed, which uses various security crypto algorithms. In several works for 
authentication in AMI [2] [3] [4] the key distribution and management are not studied. In work [3], a device authentication 
mechanism and key establishment scheme for smart grid Home Area Network with few security properties is proposed. In 
work [5] a framework for key distribution and management in smart grid is given. The author in work [6] proposes a 
lightweight key and management scheme for home area network (HAN), which is one of the key components in the 
communication infrastructure of the AMI. The challenge demand of new key distribution and management schemes is 
securing AMI from cyber attacks. In this work, we propose a key distribution and management scheme in HAN, which 
uses identification scheme of Wu – Hsu [7] and tailored to smart grid. Specifically, a secure pair – wise key agreement 
scheme is designed to provide the authenticity of the smart appliances in a wireless star network of appliances in a HAN. 
The scheme for key update, key revocation and security analysis are also discussed. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the system model and problem formulations are given in section II. Section 
III provides an efficient key distribution scheme to secure high rate real time data aggregation to the utility. Security 
analysis is given in section IV. Finally, we conclude this article in section V. 
SYSTEM MODEL  
Smart grid as a complex system uses multiple communication technologies and standards in different points along the 
generation, transmission, distribution infrastructure to the consumers where the electricity is consumed. This 
communication infrastructure is ranging from Home Area Network (HAN), Building Area Network (BAN), Neighborhood 
Area Network (NAN) and the Internet. A HAN is in the lowest end of the hierarchical level, i.e. at the consumer-end.  
  
Figure 1. Illustration of HAN modeling 
The HAN enables consumers to efficiently manage their on-demand power requirement and presents the basis of a 
communication infrastructure for energy management in smart grid. HAN connects the smart meter, several smart 
electrical appliances and alternative private energy sources or electric vehicles. Figure 1 illustrates an overview of a HAN. 
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A smart meter should collect real-time power consumption of each device in HAN using short-range wireless 
communication standards like Zigbee (802.15.4) and Wi-Fi (802.11). 
Although wireless systems provide relatively cheaper and flexible solution for smart grid communication, they are also 
more vulnerable to cyber attacks compared with wired systems. 
The main focus of this study is the key distribution and management in a HAN. We consider HAN as a two-way 
communication infrastructure between end-users and utility provider with multiple appliance accesses to a centralized 
gateway (G) through the smart meter. The sensitive information exchange within the HAN is needed to introduce a strong 
security, privacy and integrity mechanism, which can guarantee the trustworthiness of the data. 
In the model, the smart appliances are considered as end nodes. A HAN presents a group of end nodes linked in a star 
topology to a gateway node, which is connected to the smart meter. Each equipment (appliances) and the smart meter are 
considered to be one hop to the gateway. An attacker located in the wireless range of the G can eavesdrop the wireless 
communication within the HAN. The attacker may launch various attacks on the HAN, including intercepting the message 
between devices, compromising, impersonation attacks, conspiracy, maliciously modifying the information, and forgery 
attack. In order to achieve data security, privacy, integrity and authentication in HAN various crypto algorithms are used, 
such as demand key distribution and management schemes. This work provides secure key distribution and management 
scheme in HAN using identification scheme of Wu-Hsu [7], which guarantees the communication security between the 
group of devices in the HAN as well as the HAN interface of the smart meter and the gateway. 
PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT SCHEME FOR HOME AREA 
NETWORK IN SMART GRID 
In this section, we first present the essential security principles needed in the networking communications system. 
The new scheme is inspired by an efficient user identification scheme with new distribution preserving anonymity for 
distributed computer networks of Tzong-Su Wu and Chien-Lung Hsu [7]. 
In addition to making the scheme fit and efficient for the smart grid, we assume that it is secure against many active 
attacks.
System Components 
According to the conceptual model introduced by NIST [8], we consider three types of defined components: smart meters 
(data collectors), Gateway controller (data aggregators) and smart appliances. 
Smart Meter   
A smart meter works as a collector collecting data and communicating with its gateway. It is responsible for collecting the 
data from all appliances in the household. 
The communication in home area network (HAN) is done using IEEE 802.15.4 Zigbee radio communications, Wi-Fi based 
communications while within wide area network (WAN) it would use GPRS communication [8], [9].   
The smart meter plays an important role and to make communication secure it contains a processor having the ability of 
operating cryptographic computations. 
Gateway Controller 
It is the data aggregator within the HAN and it is responsible to monitor the electric flows and send the real–time electric 
information to the smart appliances. Upon receiving the authentication request message from an end-device (appliances) 
and after verifying the certificate, it needs to authenticate the end-devices. 
Smart Appliances 
Smart appliances are defined as appliances, which monitor, control and protect their electrical energy usage in response 
to customer needs. In order to provide feedback and advice on their energy use, smart appliances can sense their energy 
consumption and enable substations to view the complete home energy usage. 
Smart appliances are a small but important piece of the smart grid architecture. The group of smart appliances includes 
smart meters, distributed generation capabilities, renewable energy sources and hybrid electric vehicles. 
Smart appliances have an important role in the smart grid by making residential appliances more efficient and shifting their 
usage from peak to off-peak periods, so the average electricity usage will be cut. Reducing the loads in peak periods, will 
improve the health and stability of the power grid. 
The most required functions of smart appliances are: 
 Open specification for exchange of energy consumption data, user messages, operational status, and demand 
response user control. 
 Open communications platform or providing an adaptation for other kind to this level. 
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 Ability to report demand response status and at least two types of warning messages regarding reduced energy 
efficiency of the appliance. 
 Ability to reduce load for a "delay period" 
 Ability to delay the defrost function to "off-peak" hours 
The Proposed Scheme for Device Identification 
The proposed scheme can be divided into two phases: the key generation phase and anonymous identification of devices. 
The devices can be identified by the G, a consideration that might be useful for some security purposes. After the key 
generation phase, each device will be authenticated to the G using the secret key. The G can identify the legal devices 
with an efficient protocol in the identification phase of the anonymous devices. After the identification phase, the G 
exchanges the session key with the devices. 
Key Generation 
For two large primes p and q we calculate N=p*q. For any element  𝑔𝜖 𝑍𝑁
∗  and a hash function H,  𝑒 and 𝑓 are selected 
so that  𝑒 ∗ 𝑓 = 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜙 (𝑁) where 𝜙 (𝑁) is the Euler’s totient function. The parameters N, e, g, and H function are 
public and f, p, q are kept secret, then with a secure channel each devices iD  and G receives a secret key 
       NIDD fii mod                                                                      (1)                                                                  
Where 𝐼𝐷𝑖
𝑓
  is the identity of iD   or  𝐺. 
Identification of Anonymous Devices 
The device iD transmits the request for service to the G. After receiving the request, G generates a random number 𝑅𝐺  
and calculates. 
𝑧 = 𝑔𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐾𝐺  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁                                                                                (2)                                                                      
which is then sent to iD . iD  generates a random number DR  and calculates 
𝑎 = 𝑧𝑒/𝐼𝐷𝐺 𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑁                                                                                 (3)                                                                            
NTaHSKx D
R
D mod)(                                                                    (4)                                                               
NRe Dgy
mod*                                                                                  (5)                                                                                
where T is the timestamp, H is a hash function,  𝑆𝐾𝐺   is a secret key of a Gateway and DSK  is a secret key of a devices. 
iD  sends (x, y, T) to G. 
After receiving,  G checks T and verifies the equation 
)(mod))(/(?, NTyHxID
eR
iD
G                                                     (6) 
If equation (6) is satisfied for some iDID ,  existing in the identity list, iD  is accepted as an authorized user (devices). The 
identification phase of the devices is presented in the figure 2. After the identification protocol, the devices and the 
gateway share one common session key: 
𝐾𝑗𝐺 = 𝑎
𝑥∗𝑅𝐷 = 𝑦𝑥∗𝑅𝐺 = 𝑔𝑒∗𝑥∗𝑅𝐷 ∗𝑅𝐺 (𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑁),  },.....2,1{ nj                                              (7) 
where n is the number of smart appliances in the HAN. 
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Figure 2.  Illustration of the identification phase of the devices 
High Rate Secure Data Aggregation 
For a device in direct communication with the G, we consider the HAN structure in Figure 1, where privacy is preserved 
when data is directly forwarded to the neighborhood area network (NAN) gateway through the secure network of G. The 
privacy security requirement for AMI, including energy usage pattern and power demand of a customer, should be kept 
secret to prevent access of unauthorized users. Homomorphic encryption techniques are to carry out different operations 
on cipher text and return results without knowing the plaintext messages. Several encryption techniques exist, which 
support different homomorphic techniques, such as multiplicative homomorphism RSA-[10], additive homomorphism- 
Paillier [11], Boneh – Goh- Wissim [12]. An additive homomorphic encryption scheme has been developed by M. Onen 
and R. Molva, which provides secure end-to-end confidentiality data aggregation and can very well adapt to the electricity 
usage privacy requirements. In order to implement a new scheme with key distribution and management for smart grid we 
use Wu – Hsu identification scheme. 
Group Key Generation for Devices 
We derive the shared group key from the pair-ways keys generated in the above scheme. Group key is generated from 
each and every legitimate smart device of the group. The unauthenticated group key agreement is based on the Diffie 
Hellman (DH) key agreement. 
Suppose n denotes the total number of smart appliances (devices) in the HAN. Let  𝐺𝐾  be the group key for all devices in 
the HAN. The G first generates a symmetric key with each and every device in the HAN as described in the previous 
section. Then the G will aggregate all the symmetric keys in one common group key as follows: 
𝐺𝐾 =  𝐾𝑗𝐺 =
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐾1𝐺 ∗ 𝐾2𝐺  .  .  .  .   .   . 𝐾𝑛𝐺 = 
= 𝑔𝑒∗𝑅𝐺 (𝑅𝐷,1 + 𝑅𝐷,2 +  .  .  .  .  .  𝑅𝐷,𝑛), where iDR ,  is the randomly generated number of the i
th
 devices. 
After this step, the G will use the individually shared secret key to encrypt the group key and create the messages 
)( KKi GEmsg iD
  to each corresponding 𝐷𝑖  in the HAN. 
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Key Update/Freshness 
One of the important key management requirements is that an attacker should not be able to decrypt the intercepted 
messages in the past if a node is attacked and its secret material compromised. Thus, it is not desirable to encrypt 
messages using the same distributed key in every session, i.e. the distributed keys need to be updated / refreshed 
periodically. Therefore, the G and all the devices respectively generate the messages encryption key, 𝑅𝐺  and 𝑅𝐷  in each 
session in the proposed mechanism. The G and the smart appliances exchange an encrypted message using the i
th
 
version of the key 𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖
, ),....2,1( nj . They replace the common session key 𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖   by the 𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖+1 = 𝐻(𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖 ) and clear 
𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖
 where H is a secure hash function. This dependence can be shown from the following equations: (2), (3), (4), (5), (7). 
As can be seen from the equation (7) for different randomly chosen numbers 𝑅𝐺  and 𝑅𝐷   the session key 𝐾𝑗𝐺
𝑖
 has 
different values. If either or both parties are compromised, the attacker can capture only the most recent version of the key 
and cannot calculate any previous versions of the key, due to the one-way property of H. Thus the pair-wise key can be 
updated very often with little computational overload due to the efficiency of the hash function. 
When any pair-wise key is updated, the group key needs to be updated, which is computationally expensive. The G needs 
to update its group key when all pair-wise keys are updated . 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
After the identification phase, every user (devices) 𝐷𝑖  securely accesses a certification authority (CA) to be loaded with 
the following parameters: the ID of devices, the multiplicative group parameters (𝑍𝑁
∗ , p, q) and H (cryptographic hash 
function).  
The security is discussed under the properties of the one-way hash function and the factorization rule.  
One-way hash function has two properties: a) it is impossible to find a message  𝑚 giving its hashed value 𝑕 𝑚  (one –
way property) and, 
b) it is impossible to find two different messages with the same hash value i.e. 𝑕 𝑚 = 𝑕(𝑚′) [13], [14]. 
Factorization. Let 𝑁 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞 and gcd 𝑒, ∅ 𝑁  = 1, where p and q are unknown large primes. For any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑍𝑁
∗ , it is 
computationally impossible to find x such that 𝑦 = 𝑥𝑒(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) with the knowledge of 𝑁 and e [15]. 
Authentication  
In the symmetric key scheme, the G and a 𝐷𝑖  select two random numbers 𝑅𝐺  and 𝑅𝐷  in the multiplicative group and 
calculate z, x, y per Wu – Hsu scheme. A 𝐷𝑖  that has not been loaded with the group parameters will not be able to 
generate an acceptable released session key causing factorization and discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative 
group.  
One-way authentication enables the G to verify the identity of 𝐷𝑖 . Although two–way authentication provides a higher 
security where both parties can identify each other. One-way authentication owns the advantage of efficiency. If an 
attacker obtains the session key 𝐾𝑗𝐺 = 𝑦
𝑘𝑥  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 , he cannot derive the parameters 𝑧, 𝑎, 𝑥 without knowing the 
secret key of G. If the 𝐷𝑖  sends some encrypted sensitive information to the attacker then the attacker cannot recover the 
information without knowing the secret key .GSK  From Figure 1, if the attacker intercepts 𝐷𝑖  service request, then he 
cannot find z without knowing the secret key GSK  to reply to the 𝐷𝑖 . Therefore, they cannot exchange the session key  
jGK  and the attack will not be successful. 
Privacy 
The G proceeds the same way with all the devices in the HAN and generates the group key as described earlier. Each 𝐷𝑖  
only knows its own pair wise symmetric key although they share the same group key. The group key will be used by every 
device to encrypt the messages within the HAN, ensuring the privacy of each 𝐷𝑖  in the HAN. 
Below, we show that Wu-Hsu scheme is secure for securing the appliances, against some considered possible attacks, 
such as compromising attacks, The equation (1) can be rewritten as 𝑆𝐾𝐺
𝑒 = 𝐼𝐷𝐷   𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 . Based on the factorization 
rule it is impossible to calculate 𝑆𝐾𝐺  from eq. (1) with the known 𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖 . Also, from the same rule, without knowing the 
random numbers 𝑅𝐺   and 𝑅𝐷   it is impossible to find 𝑆𝐾𝐺   and 𝑆𝐾𝐷 from the expression of 𝑧 and  𝑥 by eq. (2) and eq. 
(3), respectively.  
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1) If the attacker obtains the released session key, he cannot identify the 𝐷𝑖  by using the eq. (6). From the released 
session key,  𝐾𝑗𝐺 = 𝑦
𝑘𝑥  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁  the attacker should first derive the value of 𝑦𝑘 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 . The attacker cannot 
resolve 𝑦𝑘  based on the factorization rule.  
2) The calculated parameters  𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑇  of the appliances are impossible to be falsified be the attacker. To falsify the 
parameters(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑇), the attacker has to first determine 𝑦 and  𝑇, and then try to compute 𝑥 by the expression: 
𝑥 = 𝑆𝐾𝐷𝑖𝐻 𝑦
𝑅𝐺 || 𝑇 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁. This is impossible to calculate, since the secret  𝑆𝐾𝐷𝑖   is unknown. 
3) If the attacker can find some numbers 𝑅𝐷
′   and timestamp 𝑇 ′  so that  𝐻 𝑎𝑅𝐷 || 𝑇 = 𝐻 𝑎′
𝑅
𝐷′ || 𝑇 ′ ,  then he can 
construct other identification parameters (𝑥, 𝑦′ ,𝑇 ′) needed for verification of the eq. (6) and 𝑦′ = 𝑔𝑒∗𝑅𝐷
′
𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁.  
But it is impossible to find two different values (𝑥, 𝑦′ ,𝑇 ′)  with the same hash function. 
4) The attacker cannot capture the session key, because the generation of the parameter 𝑧 requires the secret key  
𝑆𝐾𝐺 , which is protected under the FAC rule.  Without the knowledge of 𝑆𝐾𝐺 , the attacker might attempt to find the 
numbers  𝑅𝐺   and satisfy the equation  
𝑧𝑒
𝐼𝐷𝐺
= 𝑔𝑒∗𝑅𝐺  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁) and send  𝑧  to the 𝐷𝑖 .  If the attacker can choose 
such 𝑅𝐺  and 𝑧 to satisfy the equation, then he can exchange a common session key  𝐾𝑗𝐺 = 𝑎
𝑥∗𝑅𝐷 =
𝑦𝑥∗𝑅𝐺  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 with 𝐷𝑖 . According the eq. (7), the attacker can use two ways to find 𝑅𝐺   and 𝑧. 
i. Randomly choose the number 𝑅𝐺  and then try to find: 𝑧 = 𝑔
𝑅𝐺 (𝐼𝐷𝐺)
𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁 = (𝑔𝑒∗𝑅𝐺  𝐼𝐷𝐺)
𝑑  mod N, which is 
protected by FAC rule, and the attacker cannot resolve it.  
ii. Randomly choose the number z and then try to find 𝑅𝐺 . From the above equation, the attacker can find 𝑅𝐺  if he can 
solve the discrete logarithm over modulo N [16], [17]. From the above discussion, the attacker cannot capture and 
exchange the session key 𝐾𝑗𝐺  with the 𝐷𝑖 . 
CONCLUSION 
A new key distribution and management scheme is proposed for the Home Area Network (HAN), which is one of the key 
components in the communication infrastructure of the smart grid. This scheme includes various topologies of the 
communication among G and smart appliances. The scheme provides the integrity, privacy and authenticity of the real 
time meter’s data of the individual users power demand and aggregates them as real time response. A distributed pair-
wise key is proposed to securely collect individual power demand between G and 𝐷𝑖 . 
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